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Using a Shotgun to Kill a Fly: Issues with the CFPB’s 
Payday Lending Proposal and the Need to Incentivize 
Banks to Enter the Marketplace 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Credit is a vital mechanism for consumers living paycheck to 
paycheck coping with shortfalls in income.1 Such shortfalls can arise 
from numerous situations, including unexpected expenses, emergencies, 
and mismatched timing between income and expenses.2 Borrowing 
against future income is a common practice, and payday lenders serve 
consumers lacking the income necessary to adequately cover financial 
needs.3 
Payday lenders are “central figures in the fringe banking 
industry.”4 The payday lending industry has more locations than 
McDonald’s,5 extends over $38 billion in credit per year to individuals  
in 19 million households, employs over 50,000 workers, and generates 
over $2.5 billion annually in tax revenue.6 Supporters of  payday  
lending praise both the speed at which payday loans can be executed as 
well as the availability of payday loans to those unqualified for 
alternative forms of credit.7 On the other hand, opponents of payday 
lending are concerned with borrowers’ ability to repay payday loans on 
time  while  also  covering  basic  living  expenses,  in  addition  to  the 
 
 
1. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg. 
47,863, 47,866 (proposed July 22, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1041). 
2. Id. 
3. Creola Johnson, Payday Lending: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87 
MINN. L. REV. 1, 11 (2002). 
4. Id. at 8. 
5. Jeff Cox, There are More Payday Lenders in U.S. Than McDonald’s, NBC NEWS 
(Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/business/economy/there-are-more-payday- 
lenders-u-s-mcdonalds-n255156. 
6. About the Payday Advance Industry, CMTY. FIN. SERVICES ASS’N OF AM., http:// 
cfsaa.com/about-the-payday-advance-industry.aspx (last visited Jan. 18, 2016). 
7. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, PAYDAY LOANS AND DEPOSIT ADVANCE PRODUCTS: 
A WHITE PAPER OF INITIAL DATA FINDINGS 3 (2013), https://s3.amazonaws.com/ 
files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201304_cfpb_payday-dap-whitepaper.pdf. 
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aggressive debt collection practices payday lenders employ.8 
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (“CFPB”) 
proposed rule on Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost 
Installment Loans (the “Proposal”) aims to regulate, among other types 
of financing, payday loans.9 As of October 2016, the CFPB  had 
received close to one million comments regarding the Proposal, far  
more than any other proposal in the agency’s history.10 This Note 
proceeds in six Parts. Part II examines the operation of payday loans  
and outlines several of the major consequences borrowers face when 
taking out such loans.11 Part III describes the Proposal and the 
requirements it imposes on lenders.12 Part IV analyzes the Proposal in 
light of its goals of eliminating predatory lending practices and 
providing consumers with safe access to credit.13 Part V discusses how 
regulators can incentivize traditional banks to enter the payday loan 
marketplace, whether through modifications to the Proposal or other 
mechanisms.14 Part VI concludes this Note by summarizing the 
Proposal’s deficiencies and banks’ abilities to replace payday lenders.15 
 
II. THE BUSINESS OF PAYDAY LENDING 
 
Payday loans are easy to acquire, and payday lenders 
infrequently perform due diligence in determining whether a borrower 
will be able to repay a loan on time.16 As a result, significant numbers  
of unqualified borrowers take out payday loans they are unable to repay 
on time, leading borrowers to extend their loans and eventually become 
 
 
8. Id. 
9. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg. 
47,863, 47,867 (proposed July 22, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1041) (“This 
rulemaking is focused on . . . short-term loans. The largest category of short-term loans are 
“payday loans,” . . . and short-term vehicle title loans . . . .”). 
10. Yuka Hayashi, Rachel Witkowski & Gabriel Rubin, Dueling Payday-Lending 
Campaigns Deluge CFPB With Comments, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 10, 2016), http:// 
www.wsj.com/articles/dueling-payday-lending-campaigns-deluge-cfpb-with-comments- 
1476131725?mg=id-wsj. 
11. See infra Part II. 
12. See infra Part III. 
13. See infra Part IV. 
14. See infra Part V. 
15. See infra Part VI. 
16. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 10 (listing the few requirements of applying for a 
payday loan). 
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trapped in a cycle of debt.17 Further, payday lenders have a history of 
targeting low-income individuals and engaging in aggressive and 
predatory debt collection practices.18 This Part discusses how payday 
loans operate and outlines some of the major consequences  to 
borrowers, including the debt cycle borrowers often fall into, aggressive 
debt collection practices, and attempted regulation of payday lending at 
the state level. 
 
A. The Operation of Payday Loans 
 
Payday loans are short-term, high-cost loans where a borrower 
provides a post-dated check or access to a debit account in exchange for 
immediate cash.19 Applying for a payday loan is a simple process that 
contains only a few requirements.20 Unlike more traditional loans, 
payday lenders do not require collateral, consider the borrower’s other 
financial obligations, or check the borrower’s credit score.21 Borrowers 
simply promise to repay the principal in full plus a fee.22 The fee 
accompanying a payday loan is generally 10–20% of the principal 
borrowed,23 which can lead to an annual percentage rate (“APR”) as 
high as 400%.24 
A dangerous feature of payday lending is the ability of 
borrowers  to  extend  loans,25  increasing  the  costs  of  borrowing  and 
 
17.    Id. at 3–4. 
18. See id. at 11 (noting that payday lenders serve a class of borrowers with low 
incomes and no savings and do not accept partial payments for repaying loans). 
19. Michael Kenneth, Payday Lending: Can “Reputable” Banks End Cycles of Debt?, 
42 U.S.F. L. REV. 659, 660 (2008). 
20. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 7, at 8 (highlighting the ease at 
which consumers can acquire a payday loan). 
21. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg. 
47,863, 47,872 (proposed July 22, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1041); CONSUMER 
FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 7, at 9. But see, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-23-401 (West 
2016) (requiring lenders to ensure the borrower has the ability to repay the loan); MO. REV. 
STAT. § 408.500(7) (2015) (requiring lenders to consider a borrower’s ability to repay the 
loan, but does not specify how a lender may satisfy this requirement); WIS. STAT. § 138.14 
(2016) (prohibiting loans exceeding a certain percentage of a borrower’s gross monthly 
income). 
22. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg. at 
47869. 
23. This amounts to $10 to $20 per $100 borrowed.  Id. at 47867. 
24.    Id. at 47,868. 
25. Patrick Hayes, A Noose Around the Neck: Preventing Abusive Payday Lending 
Practices and Promoting Lower Cost Alternatives, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1134, 1142 
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creating the “debt cycle” trap that the Proposal aims to eliminate.26 If a 
borrower is unable to repay a payday loan when it is due, he may pay an 
additional fee to “roll-over” the loan to extend the due date.27 The roll- 
over fee is usually equal to the initial fee to receive the  loan.28  A 
borrower remains indebted until he repays the principal plus any costs 
and interest.29  Lenders typically refuse to accept partial payments for  
the principal, forcing borrowers to extend loans until they can repay the 
entire balance in one payment.30 The roll-over process can trap the 
borrower in a cycle of debt, with the borrower repeatedly extending a 
loan and incurring additional fees and the lender content to keep the 
principal unpaid.31 The danger of the roll-over feature is displayed in a 
study conducted by the Center for Responsible Lending (“CRL”), which 
found  that  although  borrowers  had  an  average  loan  amount  of only 
$350, borrowers in the study paid a median total of $458 in fees and one 
in four borrowers paid at least $781 in fees.32 
Supporters and opponents of payday lending both acknowledge 
that repeat borrowers are critical to the payday lending business  
model.33 Dan Feehan, former CEO of payday lender Cash America,  
once stated that “the theory in the business is you’ve got to get that 
customer in, work to turn him into a repetitive customer, long-term 
customer, because that’s really where the profit is.”34 Payday lenders 
employ a variety of techniques to encourage repeat borrowing.35 Some 
lenders instruct employees to pressure customers into borrowing more,36 
 
(2009). 
26. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg. at 
47,926. 
27. Kenneth, supra note 19, at 660. 
28. Johnson, supra note 3, at 10–11. 
29. Johnson, supra note 3, at 11 
30. Kenneth, supra note 19, at 660. 
31. Heather L. Petrovich, Circumventing State Consumer Protection Laws: Tribal 
Immunity and Internet Payday Lending, 91 N.C. L. REV. 326, 331 (2012). 
32. Thomas Edsall, Making Money Off the Poor, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2013, 10:48 
PM), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/17/making-money-off-the-poor/?_r=0. 
33. See, e.g., Nathalie Martin, 1,000% Interest – Good While Supplies Last: A Study of 
Payday Loan Practices and Solutions, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 563, 573 (2010); Payday, Vehicle 
Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg. 47,863, 47,874 (proposed July 
22, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1041) (noting that payday lending is “dependent 
upon a large volume of reborrowing”). 
34. Edsall, supra note 32. 
35. Martin, supra note 33, at 573. 
36. Martin, supra note 33, at 575. 
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while others provide monetary incentives rewarding employees  and 
store managers for loan volumes.37 One participant in a study claimed 
that if a customer paid off the interest on time five times in a row, the 
customer would receive the sixth interest payment at half price.38 The 
combination of low-income borrowers’ desperate need for credit and 
payday lenders propensity to encourage repeat borrowing creates a 
dangerous treadmill of debt, often leaving struggling borrowers worse 
off than they were prior to receiving a payday loan.39 
 
B. Predatory Lending Practices and State Regulatory Reponses 
 
Payday lenders have a history of targeting low-income 
individuals.40 Payday loan borrowers typically have  incomes  in  the 
range of $25,000–$30,000, poor credit histories, and have often 
repeatedly sought credit in the months leading up to the decision to take 
out a payday loan.41 Additionally, borrowers have often filed for 
bankruptcy either before or after taking out a payday loan.42 Payday 
lenders often utilize “coercive techniques to intimidate consumers to 
collect debts,”43 in addition to generally harmful and  harassing 
conduct.44 At the time of the Proposal’s release, the CFPB had received 
approximately 24,000 consumer complaints related to payday loan debt 
collection practices.45 
States  have  prioritized  the  regulation  of  payday  lending  to 
 
37. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg. at 
47,873. 
38. Martin, supra note 33, at 573. 
39. Edsall, supra note 32. 
40. LAUREN SAUNDERS, LEAH PLUNKETT & CAROLYN CARTER, NAT’L CONSUMER L. 
CTR., STOPPING THE PAYDAY LOAN TRAP: ALTERNATIVES THAT WORK, ONES THAT DON’T 4 
(2010), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/high_cost_small_loans/payday_loans/report- 
stopping-payday-trap.pdf (noting that payday lenders use specialized credit reporting 
services to track the subprime market). 
41. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg. at 
47,920 (claiming that nearly one in five consumers using payday loans receive some form of 
public assistance or other benefits as a source of income). One study conducted by the 
Center for Responsible Lending suggests that the median annual income of a borrower is as 
low as $22,476.  Edsall, supra note 32. 
42. See Martin, supra note 33, at 575 (citing a study revealing that as many as 10% of 
individuals who declared bankruptcy listed taking out more than one payday loan). 
43. Hayes, supra note 25, at 1143. 
44. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg. at 
47,930. 
45.    Id. at 47,898. 
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combat these predatory lending practices.46 Many states set limits on 
payday loan amounts, ranging from $300 to $1,000.47 Others limit the 
amount of a payday loan to the lesser of a percentage of the borrower’s 
income or a fixed dollar amount.48 Only two states, Nevada and 
Wyoming, are silent as to the maximum payday loan amount 
permitted.49  Some states set a maximum amount for fees, with 15%,  or 
$15 per $100, of the amount borrowed being the most common limit.50 
Michigan  limits  transactions  to  $600  and  prohibits  payday 
lending to consumers who already have more than one open transaction 
with another licensed lender.51 Fees are capped at 15% on the first $100 
borrowed, 14% on the second $100, and eventually decline to 11% on 
the fifth and sixth $100.52 Arbitration can be required only if the lender 
agrees to cover all of the expenses relating to arbitration.53 In addition, 
Michigan created a private right of action for any “person injured by a 
licensee’s violation” of its Deferred Presentment Services Transactions 
 
46. For more information on state statutes regulating payday lending, visit Payday 
Lending State Statutes, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS. (Sept. 9, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/ 
research/financial-services-and-commerce/payday-lending-state-statutes.aspx.    Georgia 
even declared that “the site or location of a place of business where payday lending takes 
place . . . is . . . a public nuisance.” GA. CODE ANN. § 16-17-8 (2016). 
47. At least nineteen States cap payday loan amounts at $500 or $600 (Alabama, 
Alaska, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, and Virginia), while California limits payday loans to $300, and Delaware caps 
payday loans at $1,000. See ALA. CODE § 5-18A-12(a) (2016); ALASKA STAT. § 06.50.410 
(2016); CAL. FIN. CODE § 23035(a) (West 2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5 § 2227(7) (2016); 
FLA. STAT. § 560.404(5) (2016); HAW. REV. STAT. § 480F-4(c) (2016); IOWA CODE § 
533D.10(1)(b) (2016); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-2-4-4(1)(c) (2016); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
286.9-100(9) (West 2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 487.2153(1) (2016); MISS. CODE ANN. § 
75-67-519(2) (2016); MO. REV. STAT. § 408.500(1) (2016); NEB. REV. STAT. § 45-919(1)(b) 
(2016); N.D. CENT. CODE § 13-08-12(3) (2016); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1321.39(A) (West 
2015); OKLA. STAT. tit. 59 § 3106(7) (2016); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-14.4-5.1(a) (2016); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 34-39-180(B) (2016); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 54-4-66 (2016); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 45-17-112(o) (2016); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-1816(5) (2016). 
48. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-46-413(1)–(2) (2016) (limiting a payday loan amount to  
the lesser of 25% of a borrower’s income or $1,000); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 122/2-5(e) 
(2016)  (limiting  payday  loan  amount  to  the  lesser  of  25%  of  a  borrower’s  income or 
$1,000); IND. CODE § 24-4.5-7-402, 404 (2016) (20% or $550); WASH. REV. CODE § 
31.45.073(2) (2016) (30% or $700); WIS. STAT. § 138.14(12)(b) (2016) (35% or $1,000). 
49.   NEV. REV. STAT. § 604A.425(1)(b) (2015); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-14-363 (2016). 
50. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg. 
47,863, 47,869 (proposed July 22, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1041). 
51. Jopel Shih, Payday Lending: A Thin Line Between Love and Hate, 3 FAULKNER L. 
REV. 37, 58 (2011). 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
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Act, which includes a right to recover attorney’s fees.54 
New Mexico once relied on small-loan legislation to regulate 
payday loans, but the absence of a dedicated payday-lending statute left 
a void in regulation.55 Eventually, New Mexico capped payday loan  
fees at $15.50 per $100 borrowed.56 Payday lenders must offer an 
automatic 130-day, no-cost payment plan, as well as limit outstanding 
loans to 25% of a borrower’s gross monthly income.57 
North Carolina prohibits payday lending.58 However, online 
payday lenders based overseas or on Indian reservations continue to 
make payday loans by taking advantage of a legal  principle  called 
Tribal Sovereign Immunity; in referencing this principle, payday  
lenders claim they are not subject to North Carolina laws, a common 
practice among payday lenders throughout the U.S.59 Additionally, 
payday lenders contract with “federally chartered banks . . . to take 
advantage of federal banking laws that allow such banks to make loans 
across state lines without regard to that state’s interest [rate limits] in 
‘rent-a-charter’ or ‘rent-a-bank’ contracts.”60 Despite increased state 
regulation, the payday loan industry regularly finds and  abuses 
loopholes in almost every state law passed.61 Overall, the CFPB argues 
that the Proposal is necessary to adequately protect consumers because 
state regulations have not been able to substantially reduce rates of 
 
 
54.   MICH. COMP. LAWS § 487.2165 (2016). 
55. Shih, supra note 51, at 58. 
56. Megan Kamerick, Compromise Reached on Proposed Payday Lending Reforms, 
ALBUQUERQUE BUS. FIRST (Feb. 13, 2007, 7:30 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/ 
albuquerque/stories/2007/02/12/daily15.html. 
57. Id. 
58. Payday Loans, N.C. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, http://www.ncdoj.gov/Consumer/Credit- 
and-Debt/Payday-Loans.aspx (last visited Dec. 20, 2016). 
59. Id. For more information on payday lenders using Tribal Sovereign Immunity to 
evade state regulation, see generally Nathalie Martin & Joshua Schwartz, The Alliance 
Between Payday Lenders and Tribes: Are Both Tribal Sovereignty and Consumer  
Protection at Risk?, 69 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 751 (2012). 
60.   Ga. Cash Am., Inc. v. Greene, 318 Ga. App. 355, 359 (2012). 
61. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 33, at 578–95; Creola Johnson, America’s First 
Consumer Financial Watchdog is on a Leash: Can the CFPB Use Its Authority to Declare 
Payday-Loan Practices Unfair, Abusive, and Deceptive?, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 381, 399–401 
(2012) (noting how payday lenders use Native American tribal immunity to circumvent state 
regulations); William Isaac, Why Payday Loans are Good for Millions of People, AM. 
BANKER (Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/why-payday-loans- 
are-good-for-millions-of-people-1061280-1.html (“Some online lenders avoid regulation by 
setting up operations offshore or on an Indian reservations outside the reach of regulators.”). 
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reborrowing and effectively protect particularly vulnerable borrowers.62 
C. Lack of Consumer Understanding 
 
There is mixed data and sentiment with respect to borrowers’ 
understanding of their rights and obligations when taking out payday 
loans.63 Critics of payday lending suggest there is a tremendous lack of 
understanding among borrowers caused by numerous factors, some of 
which are attributable to payday lenders and others not.64 Due to this 
alleged gap in knowledge, borrowers infrequently appreciate the 
commitment they are entering into when taking out payday loans.65 For 
example, borrowers tend to incorrectly believe they will not need to roll 
over their loan.66 Unfortunately, borrowers often underestimate  the 
length of time their indebtedness will last.67 In a 2012 study where 
borrowers were interviewed at curbside after taking out a payday loan, 
borrowers consistently misunderstood how the loans were structured.68 
Several borrowers were unaware that paying the minimum fees did not 
reduce the principal.69 Furthermore, few respondents could recite the 
APR on their loans70 and borrowers had difficulty stating the dollar cost 
of their loans over time.71 
In contrast, other studies suggest that payday lenders provide 
 
 
62. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg. 
47,863, 47,931–32 (proposed July 22, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1041) (arguing 
that state regulatory frameworks have “still left many consumers vulnerable to the specific 
harms . . . relating to reborrowing, default, and collateral harms from making unaffordable 
payments”). 
63. Dennis Shaul, CFPB Payday Loan Rule Ignores Existing Research, LAW360 (Sept. 
22, 2016), http://www.law360.com/articles/842022/opinion-cfpb-payday-loan-rule-ignores- 
existing-research. 
64. Factors leading to a lack of understanding among borrowers include misleading 
marketing on how payday loans work, borrowers’ perception that no alternative exists, 
financial distress leading to a lack of searching for alternative options. Payday, Vehicle  
Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg. at 47,928. 
65. See Ronald Mann, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV. 855, 881–82 (2007) (“[A] 
person with normal experiences, normal time constraints, and normal intelligence does not 
easily evaluate the risks and rewards of a payday lending transaction.”). 
66. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg. at 
47,928. 
67. Id. 
68. Martin, supra note 33, at 599–600. 
69. Martin, supra note 33, at 600. 
70. Martin, supra note 33, at 600. 
71. Martin, supra note 33, at 600. 
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sufficient information for borrowers to make informed decisions.72 A 
2016 survey conducted by the Global Strategy Group and the Tarrance 
Group found that as many as 96% of payday loan borrowers said they 
completely understood how long it would take to repay their payday 
loan and the fees they would incur.73 That same survey also suggests  
that over 90% of borrowers said the lender “clearly explained” both the 
terms of the loan and the consequences of not repaying the loan on 
time.74 
 
III. THE PROPOSED RULE 
 
The Proposal is one of the most divisive in the history of the 
CFPB.75 This Part describes what types of loans are covered under the 
Proposal.76 Then, it outlines the ability-to-repay (“ATR”) test and what 
it is designed to address.77 This Part ends by  explaining  the 
circumstances in which the Proposal exempts lenders from conducting 
an ATR test and other reporting requirements under the Proposal.78 
 
A. Loans Covered Under the Proposal 
 
The Proposal applies to two types of loans (“Covered Loans”).79 
The first type of Covered Loans are those with terms of over forty-five 
days, including loans where vehicle title is taken as collateral.80 This 
Note focuses on the second type of Covered Loans: those with terms of 
forty-five days or less, including typical fourteen-day and thirty-day 
payday loans.81 
 
72. GLOB. STRATEGY GRP. & TARRANCE GRP., BORROWER AND VOTER VIEWS OF 
PAYDAY LOANS 18 (2016), http://www.tarrance.com/docs/CFSA-BorrowerandVoterSurvey- 
AnalysisF03.03.16.pdf. 
73. Id. at 6. 
74. Id. 
75. See As the Comment Period Comes to a Close, Legislators Diverge on Payday 
Lending, PYMNTS (Oct. 4, 2016), http://www.pymnts.com/news/alternative-financial- 
services/2016/as-the-comment-period-comes-to-a-close-legislators-diverge-on-payday- 
lending/. 
76. See infra Part III.A. 
77. See infra Part III.B. 
78. See infra Part III.C. 
79. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg. 
47,863, 47,911 (proposed July 22, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1041). 
80.    Id. at 47,912. 
81.    Id. at 47,869.  The Proposal does not apply to (1) purchase money security  interest 
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B. The Ability-to-Repay Test 
 
The Proposal declares it an “abusive and unfair practice” for a 
lender to make a covered loan without reasonably determining that the 
borrower can repay the loan while also paying for certain living 
expenses.82 The Proposal requires a lender to conduct an ATR test prior 
to making a covered loan.83 In conducting an ATR test, a lender must 
make a reasonable determination that the potential borrower would be 
able to repay the loan on time while also meeting his other “major 
financial obligations” and “basic living expenses.”84 A lender must 
determine that the borrower will be able to cover his basic living 
expenses without needing to extend the loan or take out another loan 
within the thirty days following the initial payday loan.85 The lender 
must conduct an ATR test using the borrower’s income, any other 
outstanding debt obligations, and living expenses.86 
In conducting an ATR test, a lender must: (1) verify the 
consumer’s net income; (2) verify the consumer’s debt obligations using 
two different consumer reporting systems; (3) verify the consumer’s 
housing costs or use a reliable method of estimating a consumer’s 
housing expense; (4) forecast a reasonable amount of basic living 
expenses necessary for a consumer to maintain the consumer’s health, 
welfare, and ability to produce income; (5) project the consumer’s net 
income, debt obligations, and housing costs for a period of time based 
on the term of the loan; and (6) determine the consumer’s ability to 
repay the loan based on the lender’s projections of the consumer’s 
income, debt obligations, and housing costs and forecast of basic living 
expenses for the consumer.87 
One  of  the  Proposal’s  priorities  is  to  combat  the  debt cycle 
 
 
loans extended solely to finance the purchase of a car or other consumer good where the 
good secures the loan; (2) home mortgages and other loans secured by real property; (3) 
credit cards; (4) student loans; (5) non-recourse pawn loans; and (6) overdraft services and 
lines of credit. Id. at 47,917. Although these products have the potential to lead to harmful 
consequences similar to those of payday lending, these types of loans arise in  distinct 
markets that the CFPB believes may pose a different set of concerns for borrowers. Id. 
82.    Id. at 47,864–65. 
83.    Id. at 47,865. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
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borrowers often fall into.88 The CFPB refers to this debt cycle as 
“sustained use,”89 which is the long-term or repeated use of short-term, 
high-cost products.90 This may become harmful when borrowers utilize 
these products to cover continuous cash flow shortages,91 forcing 
borrowers to incur fees that eventually exceed the principal.92 A pattern 
of sustained use may indicate that a borrower is unable to repay the 
principal while also meeting his other basic living expenses.93 The ATR 
test aims to ensure that borrowers, when taking out payday loans, can 
repay loans on time while covering these necessities.94 
Studies and surveys shed light on sustained use and the debt trap 
into which borrowers often fall into.95 A 2013 CFPB study surveying a 
twelve-month period found that the median number of transactions per 
payday borrower was ten, and borrowers were indebted for a median of 
199 days.96 A 2009 survey conducted by the CRL found that as little as 
2% of payday loan volume stems from non-repeat borrowers, and over 
80% of payday borrowers take out multiple payday loans per year.97 
Further, a 2004 study conducted by the CRL found that payday lenders 
make 91% of payday loans to borrowers who take out at least five loans 
per year.98 
The ATR test, by ensuring that borrowers will be better able to 
 
 
88. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 7, at 4. 
89. Id. 
90. Id.; see also id. at 43 (noting that a “sizeable” share of borrowers conduct many 
short-term transactions over a long period of time). 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 4. 
93. Id. at 24. 
94. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg. 
47,863, 47,936 (proposed July 22, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1041) (addressing 
how the ATR test can help avoid many injuries borrowers face, one of which is the inability 
to cover basic living expenses while repaying the loan on time). 
95. Martin, supra note 33, at 573. 
96. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 7, at 23. 
97. LESLIE PARRISH & URIAH KING, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, PHANTOM 
DEMAND: SHORT-TERM DUE DATE GENERATES NEED FOR REPEAT PAYDAY LOANS, 
ACCOUNTING FOR 76% OF TOTAL VOLUME 2–3 (2009), http://www.responsiblelending.org/ 
payday-lending/research-analysis/phantom-demand-final.pdf; see also Martin, supra  note 
33, at 573 (noting how empirical studies report that repeat customers comprise “the vast 
majority” of all payday lending customers). 
98. KEITH ERNST, JOHN FARRIS & URIAH KING, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, 
QUANTIFYING THE ECONOMIC COST OF PREDATORY PAYDAY LENDING 7 (2004), http:// 
www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/research-analysis/ 
CRLpaydaylendingstudy121803.pdf. 
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repay their loans on time, theoretically eliminates, or at least curbs, the 
predatory debt collection practices payday lenders or third-party debt 
collectors often employ.99 Collection activities include calls, letters, and 
visits to borrowers’ homes and workplaces.100 Many payday lenders 
pursue judicial action as well.101 Moreover, some lenders turn to illegal 
debt collection practices, such as false threats to add new fees, deceptive 
messages to induce borrowers to return calls, and fallacious referrals to  
a non-existent in-house collections department.102 These practices can 
cause psychological distress and anxiety in borrowers who are already 
under financial pressure.103 The Proposal addresses these exploitative 
techniques through the ATR test, which would reduce borrowers rolling 
over loans, reduce default rates, and thus, reduce the need for lenders to 
collect.104 
 
C. Principal Payoff Option for Certain Short-Term Loans 
 
The principal payoff option allows a lender, without conducting 
an ATR test, to make a covered loan up to $500 if the loan does not 
include a security interest in a vehicle.105 The principal payoff option is 
designed for lower-risk lending situations.106  The lender may  extend  
the loan twice, but only if the principal is reduced by one-third each 
time.107 However, a lender may not make a covered loan if it would 
result in the borrower either having more than six outstanding covered 
 
 
99. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg. at 
47,874 (outlining various collection methods lenders employ upon default). 
100. CFPB COMPLIANCE BULLETIN 2015-2017, IN-PERSON COLLECTION OF CONSUMER 
DEBT, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Dec. 16, 2015), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/ 
201512_cfpb_compliance-bulletin-in-person-collection-of-consumer-debt.pdf. 
101. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg. at 
47,874 (“A study of small claims court cases filed in Utah from 2005 to 2010 found that 
38% of cases were attributable to payday loans.”). 
102. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, SUPERVISORY HIGHLIGHTS 17–19 (Spring 2014), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201405_cfpb_supervisory-highlights-spring-2014.pdf. 
103. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg. at 
47,930. 
104. See id. at 47,865 (describing the primary and secondary impacts of the ATR test). 
105. Id. 
106. CFPB Fact Sheet: Payday Debt Traps (Payday, auto-title, and similar credit), 
NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE CREDIT UNION SUPERVISORS (2016), http://nascus.org/regulatory- 
resources/CFPB%20Fact%20Sheet%20Payday%20Debt%20Traps%206-28-16.php. 
107. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg. at 
47,930. 
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loans during a consecutive twelve-month period or being in debt for 
more than ninety days during that same period.108 
The principal payoff option includes a number of screening and 
structural protections for consumers receiving loans not covered under 
the Proposal.109 These protections reduce the likelihood and magnitude 
of consumer harm from defaulting on and extending payday loans.110 
The exception would allow a consumer with occasional shortfalls in 
income to receive a limited number of covered loans.111 
 
D. Registered Information Systems and Monitoring 
 
The Proposal also requires lenders to disseminate basic 
information for covered loans to registered information systems 
regarding origination, any updates to that information over the life of  
the loan, and certain information when the borrower repays the loan in 
full.112 According to the CFPB, the registered  information  systems 
would provide a “reasonably comprehensive record” of a borrower’s 
recent and current borrowing.113 Over time, this registered information 
system will alleviate some of the burden on the lender in determining 
whether a consumer passes the ATR test.114 
Lenders are also required to establish and follow a compliance 
program and retain certain additional records.115 Lenders must also 
develop and follow certain written policies designed to ensure 
compliance with the Proposal.116 Lenders would be responsible for 
retaining the loan agreement, documentation obtained for a covered  
loan, and electronic records including origination calculations and 
determinations for a covered loan for a borrower who passes the ATR 
test.117 
 
 
108. Id. 
109.    Id. at 47,969. 
110.    Id. at 47,865. 
111.    Id. at 47,970. 
112.    Id. at 47,866. 
113. Id. 
114. See id. (discussing how registered information systems “would provide a  
reasonably comprehensive record” of a consumer’s borrowing habits). 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED RULE 
 
This Part analyzes the Proposal and critiques it in light of its 
goals. First, Section A outlines concerns over the breadth of the 
Proposal and the potential for reduced access to credit, as well as 
available alternatives to payday loans.118 Second, Section B describes 
mixed consumer sentiment towards payday lending and whether 
consumers truly desire payday lending reform.119 
 
A. Breadth of the Proposal and Reduced Consumer Access to 
Credit 
 
Payday lenders furnish a valuable service by providing credit, 
and therefore short-term relief, to borrowers often in their most 
desperate time of need.120 Borrowers who do  not  qualify  for  other 
credit products praise the availability of payday loans,121 and  often 
report having no alternative source of credit when taking out a payday 
loan.122 One survey suggests over nine in ten borrowers  agree  that 
payday loans can be a sensible decision for consumers who are faced 
with unexpected expenses.123 
Payday lenders fear that the “extremely complex and 
prescriptive nature” of the voluminous 1,300-page Proposal will 
regulate them out of the market.124 Consumers will face reduced access 
to credit if droves of payday lenders exit the marketplace.125 The CFPB 
is sensitive to these concerns and recognizes the need for emergency 
 
 
118. See infra Part IV.A. 
119. See infra Part IV.B. 
120. CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, PAYDAY LOANS PUT FAMILIES IN THE RED (2009), 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/research-analysis/payday-puts-families- 
in-the-red-final.pdf. 
121. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 7, at 3. 
122. GLOB. STRATEGY GRP. & TARRANCE GRP., supra note 72, at 18 (noting that almost 
75% of borrowers who took out a payday had no alternative access to credit). 
123. GLOB. STRATEGY GRP. & TARRANCE GRP., supra note 72, at 17. 
124. Comment Letter from Camden Fine, Pres. & CEO, Indep. Cmty. Bankers of Am., 
& Jim Nussle, Pres. & CEO, Credit Union Nat’l Ass’n, to Richard Cordray, Dir., Consumer 
Fin. Prot. Bureau (June 27, 2016), https://www.cfpbmonitor.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/ 
5/2016/06/ICBA-Letter.pdf. 
125. Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB Examines Payday Lending (Jan. 
19, 2012, 7:50 PM), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumer- 
financial-protection-bureau-examines-payday-lending/; Fine & Nussle, supra note 124. 
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credit,126 but if the Proposal is adopted, many lenders, including 
community banks and credit unions, may eliminate existing products or 
refrain from developing new borrower-friendly, short-term loan 
options.127 
The Proposal will impact different lenders in different ways.   
For example, community banks and other smaller lenders operate 
differently from larger institutions.128 Most community banks  are  
locally owned and have strong ties to their surrounding communities.129 
Regulatory compliance requirements will impose a disproportionate 
burden on community banks and smaller lenders relative to larger 
institutions, which have dedicated legal resources, larger compliance 
staffs, and can shift the costs of compliance across a larger number of 
loans.130 A heavier compliance burden places smaller lenders at a 
competitive disadvantage and may lead to reduced consumer access to 
credit if these lenders, as a response to being disadvantaged, exit the 
marketplace.131 
Reduced access to credit as a result of the Proposal may cause 
consumers to borrow from alternative sources less beneficial than 
payday loans, including offshore payday lenders, whom the CFPB has 
already targeted.132 Supporters of payday lending argue that a payday 
loan may be better than no credit at all.133 However, opponents of 
payday lending contend that the risk of borrowers turning to less 
reputable or beneficial providers of credit is insufficient to justify 
allowing current practices in the payday lending industry to continue.134 
Weakening the argument of the payday lending community is 
that there are numerous alternatives for borrowers even if the Proposal 
 
126. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg. 
47,863, 47,920 (proposed July 22, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1041). 
127. Fine & Nussle, supra note 124. 
128. See Comment Letter from Viveca Ware, Exec. Vice Pres. Reg. Pol’y, Indep. Cmty. 
Bankers of Am., to David Silberman, Assoc. Dir. for Research, Markets, and Regulations, 
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau 8 (Oct. 6, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/ 
document?D=CFPB-2016-0025-0033 (discussing how the Proposal impacts lenders with 
different operations). 
129. Id. at 1. 
130. Id. at 8. 
131. Id. 
132. Mann, supra note 65, at 886. 
133. Richard Hynes, Payday Lending, Bankruptcy, and Insolvency, 69 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 607, 610 (2012). 
134. Mann, supra note 65, at 887–88. 
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regulates some lenders out of the marketplace.135 For example, credit 
card cash advances are less expensive than payday loans, typically 
offering an APR of 30%.136 Small consumer-finance companies offer 
small short-term loans with a cost up to 60% APR, but are usually in the 
range of 25 to 36%.137 These loans allow a consumer to borrow $1000 
for a year at an overall lower cost than a $300 payday loan over the 
same period.138 Many employers advance paychecks—a process which 
has no interest at all139—where an employee repays the advance out of 
his next paycheck.140 Additionally, banks could fill any gap  in  
consumer access to credit the Proposal leaves behind.141 
Notwithstanding the availability of numerous lower cost alternatives to 
payday loans, one issue remains: scores of borrowers simply do not 
qualify or choose not to utilize these alternative products, adding 
strength to payday lenders’ arguments with respect to the Proposal’s 
potentially devastating impact on reduced consumer access to credit.142 
 
B. Consumer Satisfaction with the Payday Lending Industry 
 
Studies reveal mixed attitudes among consumers with respect to 
the payday lending industry.143   The CFPB gathered the information 
 
 
135. Hayes, supra note 25, at 1158 (noting how banks and credit unions provide lower 
cost alternatives to payday loans). But see Hayes, supra note 25, at 1158 (“[B]anks and 
credit unions have traditionally shied away from payday lending.”). 
136. Alternatives to Payday Loans, PINE TREE LEGAL ASSISTANCE (Sept. 2014), http:// 
ptla.org/alternatives-payday-loans. 
137. Brendan Case, With Payday Loans, Poor Get the Loans, Firms Get the Payday, 
DALLAS NEWS: MONEY (July 2010), http://www.dallasnews.com/business/money/2010/07/ 
26/with-payday-loans-poor-get-the-loans-firms-get-the-payday. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. Dana Dratch, How Employee Salary Advances Work (Jul. 17, 2013), http:// 
www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/employee-salary-pay-advance-1273.php. 
141. Hayes, supra note 25, at 1158. 
142. See Martin, supra note 33, at 618–19 (claiming borrowers do not use alternatives to 
payday loans out of embarrassment). 
143. E.g., U. OF N.C. CTR. FOR CMTY. CAPITAL, NORTH CAROLINA CONSUMER AFTER 
PAYDAY LENDING: ATTITUDES AND EXPERIENCES WITH CREDIT OPTIONS 12 (2007), http:// 
www.nccob.gov/public/docs/News/Press%20Releases/Archives/2007/ 
NC_After_Payday.pdf (finding “stark” differences in attitudes towards payday lending). 
Some payday loan users praise the speed at which they could acquire money, yet others feel 
payday lenders take advantage of desperate borrowers. Id. Borrowers  highlighted  the 
benefit of using payday loans for “extra money between paychecks,” yet others reported 
they took out a payday loan and eventually “go[t] into more debt.” Id. 
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underlying the Proposal from numerous sources, including consumer 
complaints.144 As of January 1, 2016, the CFPB had received 
approximately 36,200 consumer complaints relating to payday loans.145 
Specific complaints include payday lenders’ behavior causing 
psychological and emotional distress due to numerous phone calls, 
threats of legal action, and repeated contacts with borrowers’ family 
members and employers.146 Additional complaints include payday 
lenders initiating payments before the due date on loans and triggering 
bank fees by attempting to withdraw more than the scheduled  
amount.147 
Despite the list of borrowers’ complaints, it is unclear whether 
consumer sentiment is as opposed to payday lending practices as the 
CFPB suggests.148 In July 2011, the CFPB launched a complaint portal 
where consumers could voice their frustrations about financial firms.149 
After filing a Freedom of Information Act request, the Community 
Financial Services Association of America (“CFSA”), a trade  
association representing the short-term lending industry, claimed that 
12,308 of the 12,546 comments submitted “praised the industry . . . or 
otherwise indicated positive experiences.”150 The CFSA  argues  that 
more than 98% of comments submitted on short-term loans praised the 
industry for its products and services.151 Further, the CFSA claimed the 
“vast majority” of the 238 comments indicating negative experiences 
were either mistakenly categorized as payday lending comments or 
related to scams and unregulated lenders that the Proposal fails to 
address.152 
The discrepancy between the apparent high level of  satisfaction 
 
144. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg. 
47,863, 47,867 (proposed July 22, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1041). 
145.    Id. at 47,898. 
146.    Id. at 47,991. 
147.    Id. at 48,050. 
148. See GLOB. STRATEGY GRP. & TARRANCE GRP., supra note 72, at 29 (suggesting that 
borrowers are generally supportive of payday lending). 
149. Yuka Hayashi, Consumers With Complaints Flock to CFPB, WALL ST. J. (July 25, 
2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/cfpb-complaints-center-generates-results-and- 
controversy-1469439003?mg=id-wsj. 
150. CFPB Buried, Ignored Positive Payday Loan Customer “Tell Your Story” 
Testimonials it Requested, CMTY. FIN. SERV. ASS’N OF AM. (Sept. 6, 2016), http://cfsaa.com/ 
our-resources/communications/recent-news/article-detail/newsid/131.aspx. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
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among borrowers and the state of affairs suggested in the Proposal has 
led some to question whether consumers truly desire more strict 
regulation of payday loans.153 Perhaps the high rate of borrower 
satisfaction in some surveys suggests that most payday lenders provide 
quality service, and only a few payday lenders are causing the harmful 
results that the Proposal seeks to eliminate.154 
 
V. INCENTIVIZING BANKS TO ENTER THE MARKETPLACE 
 
Banks entering the payday/high-risk short-term  loan 
marketplace could mitigate concerns over the Proposal reducing 
consumer access to credit. Additionally, banks could potentially replace 
payday lenders altogether, reducing instances of aggressive, harmful 
debt collection practices and other predatory lending activities often 
associated with payday lenders. As it stands now, the Proposal does  
little to incentivize banks to enter the marketplace. 
Part V suggests modifications to the Proposal that will 
incentivize banks to enter the payday lending marketplace and also calls 
for federal regulators to encourage and provide support to banks willing 
to provide short-term credit products to consumers. Section A discusses 
why banks are in a good position to extend payday loans.155 Next, 
Section B explains why banks are hesitant to enter the marketplace and 
suggests that these concerns may be unjustified.156 Section C then 
demonstrates how increasing the number of safe harbors that would 
permit institutions to avoid conducting ATR tests reduces banks’ 
concerns and encourages banks to enter the marketplace, using one safe 
harbor based off of the Qualified Mortgage principal in Sections 1411 
and 1412 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) as a model.157 
 
 
153. Id. 
154. See GLOB. STRATEGY GRP. & TARRANCE GRP., supra note 72, at 6 (“The vast 
majority of borrowers say the lender clearly explained the terms of the loan . . . .  
[B]orrowers say . . . that payday lenders are flexible when working with borrowers who 
experience payment difficulties.”). 
155. See infra Part V.A. 
156. See infra Part V.B. 
157. See infra Part V.C; see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §§ 1411–12, 15 U.S.C. § 1639c (2012) (listing the 
requirements of a qualified mortgage). 
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A. Banks are Well-Positioned to Make Payday Loans 
 
Banks can recapture the entire payday lending marketplace if 
they offer alternative products and services with better terms than 
payday loans.158 Generally, banks can offer a different mix of products  
to low-income borrowers and already have an established infrastructure 
and staff.159 Banks can spread the risk of loss over all their products160 
and do not have to rely exclusively on payday loan revenues to 
operate.161 In addition, banks have greater access to capital to finance 
loans.162 Whether or not the Proposal is finalized, by competing with 
payday lenders at lower prices, banks could force payday lenders to 
adopt better terms or potentially exit the marketplace.163 
Banks possess a number of tools to compete with payday 
lenders.164 One such tool is overdraft protection charges.165 Banks can 
structure overdraft charges in a way that allows borrowers to repay such 
charges easily, similar to a payment plan.166 Products could provide a 
borrower multiple pay periods through which they can accumulate 
sufficient funds to repay the loan or allow a borrower to repay the loan 
through installments over a few weeks or months.167 Unlike payday 
lenders, banks could choose to allow partial payments, and borrowers 
would be able to build credit because banks could report those payments 
to credit agencies.168   Banks may be able to undercut payday lenders 
 
 
 
158. Michael Bertics, Fixing Payday Lending: The Potential of Greater Bank 
Involvement, 9 N.C. BANKING INST. 133, 150 (2005). 
159. Kenneth, supra note 19, at 708. But see id. (“But to become a convenient option, 
banks may need to open more locations and potentially keep longer hours.”). 
160. SHEILA BAIR, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., LOW-COST PAYDAY LOANS: OPPORTUNITIES 
AND OBSTACLES 3 (2005), https://folio.iupui.edu/bitstream/handle/10244/101/ 
FEs3622H334.pdf?sequence=1. 
161. Kelly Noyes, Get Cash Until Payday! The Payday-Loan Problem in Wisconsin, 
2006 WIS. L. REV. 1627, 1675 (2006). 
162.    Id. at 1674. 
163. See Bertics, supra note 158, at 149–50 (arguing that customers would likely deal 
with minor inconveniences, such as traveling longer distances and dealing with less 
extensive hours, to take advantage of lower rates and better terms offered by banks, which 
would allow banks to gain access to a larger customer base). 
164. Kenneth, supra note 19, at 700. 
165. Kenneth, supra note 19, at 700. 
166. Kenneth, supra note 19, at 700. 
167. Kenneth, supra note 19, at 709. 
168. Kenneth, supra note 19, at 709. 
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through limits on APRs.169 Finally, even if banks could not offer lower 
fees per loan, banks could still meet structural standards for loans that 
payday lenders could not, providing borrowers with increased 
flexibility.170 
 
B. Banks are Hesitant to Enter the Marketplace 
 
Although banks are well-positioned to make payday loans,  
many are hesitant to, or simply do not, make payday loans for numerous 
reasons.171 Three common reasons for banks’ hesitancy to enter the 
payday lending marketplace include reputational concerns, the 
profitability of payday loans, and regulatory animosity toward federally 
regulated banks offering payday loans. 
A bank’s reputation is undeniably important,172 and banks are 
concerned with the reputational risk associated with payday lending.173 
Companies and firms find it profitable to develop a reputation for 
honesty and integrity,174 and making payday loans may tarnish a bank’s 
image in the community.175 While the emphasis on maintaining a 
positive reputation is well-founded, the reputational risk of payday 
lending may not be as prevalent if there is an effective regulation 
scheme governing the practice.176 Jonathan Macey, in an article on the 
reputational    model    in    capital    markets,    argues    the  following: 
 
[T]he value to financial institutions of investing in 
reputation declines to the extent that a regulatory system 
that people believe is effective is put into place. This is 
because reputation and regulation, both of which serve 
 
 
169. Kenneth, supra note 19, at 708. 
170. Kenneth, supra note 19, at 709. 
171. BAIR, supra note 160, at 9. 
172. E.g., Woodward v. Raymond James Fin., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 2d 425, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010). 
173. Michelle Leder, How the Other Half Banks: The Depressing, Amazing “Payday 
Loan” Business, SLATE (May 10, 2004), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/ 
2004/05/how_the_other_half_banks.html. 
174. Jonathan Macey, The Demise of the Reputational Model in Capital Markets: The 
Problem of the “Last Period Parasites”, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 427, 430–31 (2010). 
175. BAIR, supra note 160, at 9. 
176. See Macey, supra note 174, at 445 (arguing that reputation and an effective 
regulation scheme are direct substitutes). 
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the role of providing contracting parties with some 
reassurance that they won’t be cheated or taken 
advantage of in the course of financial dealings, are 
substitutes for one another.177 
 
Using Macey’s theory, a Proposal that adequately regulates 
payday lending could theoretically ease one of banks’ primary concerns 
by eliminating, or at least drastically reducing, the potential reputational 
harm payday lending poses to banks. 
Even if the Proposal is not adopted and there is no regulation 
scheme to substitute for reputation, banks can still protect their 
reputations if they enter the marketplace. Much of the animosity toward 
payday lending stems from the allegedly abusive behavior of payday 
lenders.178 Thus, banks can mitigate the risk of reputational harm by 
responsibly providing products similar to payday loans  without 
engaging in abusive practices. Further, banks have economic incentives 
to avoid engaging in reputation-harming practices, such as aggressive 
debt collection and predatory lending.179 Developing  a  positive 
reputation is costly and time-consuming, and harming one’s reputation 
results in losing business and increased transaction costs.180 If more 
banks enter the payday lending marketplace and transform the market 
into a competitive one, banks will be motivated to achieve profitability 
and the value of their companies will increase by developing and 
maintaining a positive reputation.181 
A second chief concern of banks revolves around the higher  
risks of payday lending, which involves risky products requiring high 
interest rates in order to maintain profitability.182 Banks are concerned 
with the profitability of payday lending even in the absence of the 
Proposal,183  and  the  Proposal  only  further  increases  the  costs  and 
 
177. Macey, supra note 174, at 445. 
178. See Shih, supra note 51, at 40 (arguing that opponents of payday lending focus not 
on the actual products, but on consumers who are “fooled into credit arrangements they 
cannot understand”). 
179. Macey, supra note 174, at 447–48. 
180. Macey, supra note 174, at 448. 
181. See Bryson Kern, Reputational Injury Without a Reputational Attack: Addressing 
Negligence Claims for Pure Reputational Harm, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 253, 256 (2014) 
(outlining how damaging a firm’s reputation places the firm’s economic security at risk). 
182. BAIR, supra note 160, at 9. 
183. Kenneth, supra note 19, at 694. 
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threatens the profitability of payday lending.184 In response to these 
concerns, the CFPB argues that it has designed the ATR test  
requirement to minimize significant and unnecessary costs.185 
Specifically, the CFPB believes that the ATR test will significantly 
offset compliance costs because the ATR test will reduce the rate of 
default, and as a result, reduce expenses associated with defaulting 
borrowers.186 
Reducing costs of compliance with the Proposal addresses one  
of banks’ primary concerns: maintaining profitability with a risky 
product like payday lending. To reduce compliance costs, the payday 
lending industry is advocating for, among other things, increased 
flexibility in reporting requirements.187 As the  Proposal  currently 
stands, lenders must meet the same reporting and verification 
requirements for each borrower.188 Flexible reporting requirements 
would enable banks to meet the specific needs of individual 
borrowers.189 Since there are a multitude of methods for conducting an 
ATR test, flexible reporting and verification requirements would enable 
banks to find the most cost effective and time efficient methods to 
ensure compliance with the Proposal.190  However, the CFPB argues  
that the Proposal already provides for sufficient flexibility; for example, 
the Proposal aims to provide “substantial flexibility” for the type of 
evidence lenders can use for verification of income and expenses.191 
Specifically, lenders may use housing estimates instead of obtaining 
verification  evidence.192  Additionally,  the  Proposal  does  not require 
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actual verification of basic living expenses.193 While this flexibility is a 
step in the right direction, it is clearly insufficient to eliminate banks’ 
concerns over maintaining profitability.194 
Banks have successfully implemented products similar to 
payday loans, which may suggest that banks’ fear over profitability may 
be unreasonably high. In 2005, Austin Bank of Chicago first offered 
Ready Cash Now, a fixed loan ranging from $300 to $999.99 with an 
APR of almost 12%.195 The loan is repaid over twelve months through 
automatic deductions from the borrower’s deposit account.196 The use  
of lines of credit similar to the one offered by Austin Bank of Chicago 
decreases servicing costs because banks do not need to assign 
employees to help borrowers renew loans every two weeks like payday 
lenders do with roll-over transactions.197 
La Salle Bank in Chicago developed a small loan product only 
available for emergency situations.198 The amount of the loan cannot 
exceed $1,000, has an APR of 12%, and a maximum term of twelve 
months.199  LaSalle has since been purchased by Bank of America,200  
and the fate of its short-term loan program is unknown.  Both  the 
LaSalle Bank and Austin Bank of Chicago products had built in 
protections to deter risky lending, including verifying a borrower’s 
employment history, limiting the maximum debt-to-income ratio 
allowed, and prohibiting the extension of loans to borrowers currently in 
bankruptcy.201 
Citibank’s Checking Plus is a revolving line of credit linked to a 
borrower’s bank account.202 The interest rate is 17%, with the balance 
repaid in monthly installments through automatic deductions.203 The 
default repayment schedule is 1/60th of the outstanding balance, and 
 
 
193. Id. 
194. See Ware, supra note 128, at 9 (expressing concern over the cost of compliance). 
195. BAIR, supra note 160, at 25. 
196. BAIR, supra note 160, at 25. 
197. Bertics, supra note 158, at 153–54. 
198. BAIR, supra note 160, at 25. 
199. BAIR, supra note 160, at 25. 
200. Bank of America Completes Purchase of LaSalle Bank, BANK OF AM., http:// 
investor.bankofamerica.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=71595&p=irol- 
newsArticle&ID=1057174#fbid=ovw64mXj0tR (last visited Dec. 18, 2016). 
201. BAIR, supra note 160, at 25–26. 
202. BAIR, supra note 160, at 27. 
203. BAIR, supra note 160, at 27. 
  
 
 
350 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 21 
borrowers can prepay the balances or request a different default 
repayment schedule.204 
The North Carolina State Employees’ Credit Union 
(“NCSECU”), in 2001, created the salary-advance loan (“SALO”), a 
revolving loan with a maximum amount of $500 with an interest rate of 
12% that is due on the borrower’s next payday.205 To obtain a SALO, a 
borrower must place 5% of each advance in a savings account in order 
to help prevent future borrowing.206 The  SALO  program  was 
successful, and the mandatory savings requirement generated $10 
million in new deposit funds.207 NCSECU members rely heavily on 
SALO loans, suggesting that the product has replaced payday loans in 
the area.208 In general, with more incentives and encouragement from 
federal agencies and regulators, banks are more likely to develop similar 
products to those outlined above and replace payday lenders, eliminate 
predatory lending, and provide at-risk borrowers with access to safer 
alternatives.209 
A final concern of banks is the perceived regulatory animosity 
toward partnerships between federally regulated banks and payday 
lenders.210 According to the payday lending industry, banks are ending 
relationships with payday lenders or ceasing to offer certain short-term 
loan products as a result of increased pressure from agencies such as the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), and the Federal Reserve.211 For 
example, in 2014, Wells Fargo & Co., U.S. Bancorp, and Fifth Third 
Bancorp, due to regulatory pressure, stopped providing short-term 
products designed as alternatives to payday loans.212 
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Regulatory scrutiny may no longer be a significant concern in 
the Trump administration, as President Trump will likely seek 
widespread cuts in regulations across the banking industry.213 
Specifically, Trump is targeting both the CFPB and the Proposal,214 On 
January 30, 2017, Trump signed an executive order requiring federal 
agencies to cut two existing regulations for every new regulation 
implemented, and also stated that his administration aims to cut 
regulations “massively” for large and small businesses.215 On February 
3, 2017, Trump signed a memorandum ordering a review of Dodd- 
Frank with the aim of “cutting a lot out” of those  rules.216  
Congressional Republicans have several means of stopping the Proposal 
from ever being  finalized.217  Republicans  could  disapprove  the 
Proposal through the Congressional Review Act, or if CFPB Director 
Cordray steps down, a Trump appointee could simply refuse to finalize 
the Proposal.218 However, even if the Proposal is not finalized, banks 
could still enter the marketplace and service this important consumer 
need at a lower cost than payday lenders.219 
 
C. Expanding the Safe Harbors Available Under the Proposal 
 
The Proposal contains one safe harbor that permits entities to 
avoid conducting ATR tests: the principal payoff option.220   The  CFPB 
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argues that not requiring lenders to conduct ATR tests for loans under 
the principal payoff option will reduce much of the costs of 
compliance.221 However, the CFPB also claims that a “substantial 
fraction of loans currently made would not qualify for the  
exemption.”222 Significantly reducing  compliance  costs  while 
exempting only a minimal number of loans under the principal payoff 
option are incongruous goals. Additional safe harbors are needed to 
adequately reduce compliance costs and incentivize banks to enter the 
marketplace. However, consumer advocates argue that creating 
additional safe harbors for conducting ATR tests weakens the overall 
rule framework.223 
Expanding on the exemptions for conducting ATR tests would 
enable banks to offer products similar to payday loans without incurring 
the costs of complying with the Proposal. This would directly address 
banks’ concerns over the profitability of payday lending. One  safe 
harbor for payday loans could be designed using the existing 
qualifications the CFPB provides for Qualified Mortgages (“QM”) 
under Dodd-Frank.224 Dodd-Frank permits a lender to extend a QM 
without conducting an ATR test, as borrowers of a QM are presumed to 
have the ability to repay the loan.225 In general, a QM is a mortgage 
where:   (1) points and fees are less than or equal to 3% of the principal; 
(2) there are no risky features such as negative amortization, interest- 
only, or balloon loans; and (3) the maximum loan term is less than or 
equal to thirty years.226 
On the other hand, if a mortgage does not qualify as a QM, 
Dodd-Frank requires lenders to make a reasonable, good faith 
determination that the consumer has a reasonable ability to repay the 
loan.227    A  lender  must  consider  eight  factors  when  conducting  an 
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ability-to-repay test for a non-QM under Dodd-Frank: (1) current or 
reasonably expected income or assets the consumer will rely upon to 
repay the loan; (2) current employment status; (3) monthly mortgage 
payment for the loan; (4) monthly payment on any simultaneous loans 
secured by the same property; (5) monthly payment for property taxes 
and insurance the lender requires the consumer to buy; (6) debts, 
alimony, and child-support obligations; (7) monthly debt-to-income 
ratio or residual income; and (8) credit history.228 The rule provides a 
private right of action, allowing borrowers to seek actual damages, 
statutory damages, costs, attorney’s fees, and special damages equal to 
the finance charges and fees incurred.229 
Both QM and the Proposal have similar goals: curbing predatory 
lending practices and protecting consumers.230 QM incentivizes lenders 
to extend safer mortgages, primarily less risky ones, by permitting 
lenders to avoid conducting ATR tests and other regulations.231 QM 
reduces the likelihood that a lender would extend a mortgage where the 
borrower lacks the ability to repay a mortgage with predatory 
characteristics.232 
The Independent Community Bankers of America (“ICBA”) 
suggest utilizing a safe harbor provision that focuses on the lender, in 
contrast to the principal payoff option, which focuses on the borrower’s 
financial standing.233 This safe harbor would apply  to  banks  whose 
loans perform above a certain threshold or do not possess risky and 
predatory  lending  characteristics.234  This  modification  encourages 
banks to act responsibly by providing an opportunity to issue payday 
loans without conducting an ATR test.235   The safe harbor proposed  by 
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the ICBA incentivizes banks to enter the marketplace by allowing banks 
to avoid compliance costs, thus reducing concerns over profitability.236 
As a matter of basic policy, responsible lenders should be subject to a 
lesser standard that recognizes their history of responsible lending 
practices and emphasis on greater consumer protection.237 The CFPB 
should be encouraging borrowers to transact with responsible lenders, 
rather than broadly imposing burdens on all lenders who provide  
payday loans.238 
The National Credit Union Administration (“NCUA”) advocates 
for exempting lenders from being required to conduct ATR tests for 
loans where the total payment owed does not exceed 5% of the 
borrower’s gross monthly income.239 This threshold arguably satisfies 
the goals of the ATR test in a less complex manner.240 Exempting loans 
with less than a 5% debt-to-income ratio reduces compliance and  
overall transactional costs in two ways: (1) lenders avoid conducting 
ATR tests and (2) borrowers are less likely to default on or rollover 
loans with a low debt-to-income ratio, thereby reducing default-related 
expenditures.241 Additionally, loans extended at a low debt-to-income 
ratio are not the primary target of the Proposal,242 since borrowers are 
more likely to be able to repay these loans while also covering basic 
living expenses, which is what the Proposal aims to  achieve.243  This 
safe harbor increases the effectiveness and efficiency of the Proposal in 
curbing   risky   loans,   while   also   encouraging   banks   to   enter the 
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marketplace by reducing banks’ fears over profitability.244 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The CFPB’s Proposal aims to eliminate payday  lending 
practices that often force borrowers into repeated, long-term use of 
payday loans. While the Proposal is designed to actively address issues 
surrounding repeat borrowing, sustained use, and harmful debt  
collection practices, the Proposal may also significantly reduce 
consumer access to credit by regulating many lenders out of the 
marketplace. One potential solution to this issue is to encourage 
traditional banks to enter the payday loan marketplace by reducing the 
Proposal’s compliance costs. Expanding the principal payoff option by 
creating additional exemptions from the ATR test requirements can 
encourage these depository institutions to offer more consumer-friendly 
products in this area. Creating safe harbors and maintaining adequate 
degrees of consumer protection are not mutually exclusive goals. 
Finally, by encouraging and supporting banks’ exploration of new 
products similar to payday loans, banks will be more likely to enter the 
marketplace and provide borrowers with safer access to short-term 
credit, even if the Proposal does not come to fruition. 
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